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Of  course Žižek is all  too aware of  the danger wherein the ‘elevation to status  of
symbolic authority has to be paid for by the death, murder even, of its empirical bearer’
(Žižek in Wright & Wright 1999: vii). This is a danger whereby praise itself leads to a kind of
premature burial and in which the object figure inevitably becomes one of the living dead. I
see the importance of this journal in precisely the opposite terms: that is to contend with
Žižek as a living voice that, in the Lacanian sense, continues to disturb and upset the basic
premises  and  conventions  of  the  prevailing  socio-cultural  milieu.  And  here  perhaps  the
stress should be placed not only on Žižek studies but also on Žižek studies in that it provides
not only a forum for critical engagement with Žižekian interventions but also a forum for
opening up new fields of inquiry. 
So why Žižek? Is  he not  simply too  pyrotechnical  to be taken  seriously? Or  even
‘worse’, is he not too much of a showman-charlatan who self-consciously courts notoriety
through formulaic inversions and iniquities? To some extent there is a grain of truth in these
charges. Given the increasingly constrained and aseptic character of our social reality then
the very nature of Žižek’s interventions must necessarily come across as a set of obscene
intrusions into ‘our’  world. His philosophy  is a kind of  shock-art  but it  certainly does not
devolve into a simple Dadaism or oppositionalism. 
Reading his first  English work  as a postgraduate,  The Sublime Object  of  Ideology
(1989), I was struck as much, if not even more, by the style and tone of the book as by its
content. Flying in the face of academic protocol it was refreshingly irreverent in combining
high theory with scandalous cultural insights and a knowing disregard for the etiquette of
political correctness. This type of intellectual carnality was not what I had come to expect
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from  post-structuralism.  But  was  Žižek  a  post-structuralist?  In  the  preface  to  the  book
Ernesto  Laclau  implied  that  he  shared  broad  affinity  with  this  tradition  and  that  any
differences were of a relatively minor kind (viz. different emphases in the reading of Hegel).
In the actual  text,  however,  it  was clear that  Žižek was opposed to some of  the central
premises of post-structuralism. So while most of us were playing catch-up as far as post-
structuralism and  deconstruction  were  concerned,  here  was  someone  who was already
presenting a set of basic challenges to the latter. The effect was rather unsettling. 
To  some  extent  the  book  caught  an  underlying  mood  of  change  in  the  late
eighties/early  nineties.  Coinciding with the demolition of  the Berlin  Wall,  the old political
landscapes were shifting and re-forming in unpredictable ways. The New Right was largely
in retreat and the official Left (New Labour, the various European ‘Third Way’ parties etc.)
were beginning to forge an historic compromise based on the pragmatic  (‘ideology-free’)
management of global market capitalism. Yet the more critical forms of intellectual life had
reached a certain impasse:  while on the one hand there existed the rather passion-less
theory of the postmoderns, on the other there was the somewhat theory-less passion of the
traditional left. Žižek, by contrast, appeared to represent something different: a passionate
theoretical engagement with philosophical and contemporary problems that provided a real
sense  of  urgency.  But  the  question  remained  as  to  exactly  how  different  his  type  of
approach was. Indeed Žižek’s own stylistic innovations, though undeniably impressive, were
sometimes counter-productive in creating a kind of wood-obscured-by-trees problem as far
as the substance of his thought was concerned.
Initially I viewed Žižek as someone who had interesting things to say about the theory
of  ideology and identification (especially as regards the notion of  the subject)  but whose
main  contribution  was  largely  in  terms  of  supporting  material  to  the  type  of  primary
perspective being developed by Laclau and Mouffe, and others, in respect of the themes of
impossibility, negativity, antagonism and so on. Žižek represented the application of these
themes  to  a  wider  field  of  cultural  engagement.  Brilliant  as  his  analyses  were  they
nonetheless appeared to me to be of a largely secondary, though important, order. For my
doctorate  at  Manchester  I  was  trying  to  develop  an  anti-economistic  approach  to  the
economy with reference to the now half-forgotten debates around the idea of disorganized
capitalism. This was already an uphill struggle as, at the time, Manchester was an extremely
conservative environment as regards theoretical inquiry (‘a little theory goes a long way’ as
my supervisor used to say – repeatedly). In this context my use of Žižek was chiefly in terms
of lending further credence to the idea that identities that could not be fixed at the level of
the economy or anywhere else. And this seemed to fit with the idea that Žižek should be
seen essentially as a post-structuralist-with-attitude: to be filed under ‘interesting Lacanian
variety’.
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In any case perhaps the Sublime Object was a one-hit-wonder and perhaps the rude
Balkanite would simply fade away and leave us all in peace. The second volume, For They
Not What They Do (1991), rather passed me by. I suspect that this was partly because I did
not want to peer under the rather comfortable bed of postgraduate life that I had made for
myself then, and partly because the submission of my thesis was imminent and I had no
intention of undertaking any further theoretical revisions. The repeated Freudian failure to
remember to pick up the new book also meant that I  could stick with the idea that  The
Sublime Object was merely a spectacular and interesting display which like an electric storm
was pleasing if looked at from a distance. It was not until the third volume, Tarrying with the
Negative (1993), that the real force of Žižek’s ideas began to hit home and to undermine the
foundations of the general  deconstructionist perspective that I had been putting together
over  some  years.  There  was  not  anything  like  the  same  number  of  jokes  or  cultural
ruminations. This was something ‘serious’ and to be taken seriously. Once the dust of his
initial intrusion had settled down it was now clearer to see where he was coming from and
the type of distinctive analytic engagement he was trying to develop as regards topics like
nationalism and racism, the limits of discourse analysis, the role of enjoyment and so on. As
far as the early postmarxist sponsorship was concerned (the first two of Žižek’s books were
published in Laclau and Mouffe’s Phronesis series), this volume represented something of a
souring  of  the  honeymoon  period  and  a  growing  divergence  in  theoretical  and  political
direction.
In a rather unexpected twist on Marx’s insight into the way in which ideas can take on
a material  force,  this  volume also impacted on me at  a personal  level:  my enthusiastic
reading of the latter precipitated the irrevocable breakdown of a long-standing relationship
(there may have been other factors involved but let’s not spoil the story). In particular it was
the whole idea of jouissance – i.e. a perverse libidinal investment in, and satisfaction from,
suffering and sacrifice – that became a T-bone of contention not only for my inamorata but
for her entire retinue. In a more litigious society I might be inclined to sue Žižek for damages
(‘actual traumatic stress’ or some such). But why was there such a toxic shock reaction to
what was chiefly an academic interest? What real transgression had I committed? Of course
there were the usual bromides concerning implicit (even complicit) betrayal: ‘psychoanalysis
is the acceptable face/theoretical endorsement of the repression of women’ etc. Charges of
this nature were relatively superficial and easy to counter.  But,  in the language of Yoda,
there appeared to be a much deeper disturbance in the force of  multi-culturalist  political
culture. 
In the case of fascism what psychoanalysis reveals is an obscene enjoyment in the
acts of sacrifice and duty vis-à-vis the state: the individual who submerges him/herself in the
collective and foregoes personal pleasures in order to derive a deeper form of enjoyment.
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With today’s (Western) multi-culturalism we tend to get an inverted form of this process.
Instead of becoming a functionary of the state, the typical multi-culturalist agent is someone
who affirms themselves as a victim of the state in order to acquire the status of significant
‘Other’  –  a  paradigmatic  clamour  for  distinctive  being.  The  basis  of  this  type  of  multi-
culturalist experience is precisely an enjoyment through victimhood; an enjoyment that must
remain hidden, off-stage. So by even talking about these matters at a general level I was
already moving towards an imaginary position where it would become possible to perceive
and identify this obscene enjoyment. This was the unknowing transgression that secured my
expulsion.
Along similar lines my innate gaucheness was responsible for further discomposure
among some good friends in Helsinki. With some justification, Finnish culture prides itself on
being out-looking and cosmopolitan (virtually everyone seems to have or to know someone
who  has  connections  with  the  United  Nations  and/or  adjacent  organisations).  As  if  by
illustration of this my friends told me about a couple who were in the process of adopting a
baby from Colombia and that  what  was particularly good about this was that  they were
intending to keep the child in contact with its cultural roots. Not quite believing this I made
some sort of tasteless comment about babies and Colombian coffee vouchers which did not
go down very well. But there were two aspects that struck me particularly.
The  first  was  the  use  of  the  idea  of  cultural  roots  as  if  it  designated  something
authentic. In our postmodern times where all is masquerade, constructed and so on, this
has a clear fantasmatic investment: ‘we know very well that there is no such thing as an
authentic identity but nonetheless we believe in it’. On the other hand this very authenticism
serves simultaneously to underscore an essential distancing from the Other. Such identities
should be preserved in this way precisely on the grounds that they cannot be like ‘us’. This
is what is fake about contemporary multi-culturalism. The privileged sites of the latter (and
ultimately  the  US)  are  ‘beyond’  any  simple  ethnic  determination  and  consequently  can
function as ‘universal witness’ to all cultures: its very openness results from a basic closure.
Integral here is the fantasy regarding the Other’s gaze: i.e. the fantasy of how the Other
perceives  ‘us’  as  an  inimitable  optimum,  tolerant,  capable  of  benign  expansion  and
accommodation  but  unique  and elusive.  Again  this  is  a  covert  fantasy;  one that  should
remain hidden especially in light of  all  the altruistic good that  is  being achieved through
multi-culturalism
The second aspect concerns the way in which the fantasmatic shapes and conditions
the political sphere. Thus the politically acceptable response to overseas adoption was an
undertaking  to  secure  what  was  viewed  as  culturally  appropriate  for  the  child  (to  do
otherwise would be to commit the sin of cultural imperialism). In this political economy of left
and right possibilities what is presupposed is that babies  can be brought from Colombia
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(etc)  to  countries  like  Finland  but  certainly  not  the  other  way  round.  To  speak  of  the
conditions  that  make  this  possible  –  poverty,  global  imbalances of  power  and so on –
becomes in itself vulgar and offensive. It is simply better not too mention these things where
such a sensitive topic is concerned: we don’t make the rules; we can only do the best that
we can; it is sad that people may not be resourced to fully look after children but on the plus
side we can find cumbia music, salsa, the texts of Garcia Marquez and so forth in countries
like Finland (and Britain, France, Germany…). So what is disavowed is the marginalisation
behind the marginalisation: cultural marginalization is a bad thing but let’s not engage with,
or even address, the global forms of social exclusion upon which today’s cosmopolitanism
secretly depends.
With multi-culturalism all is apparently open, permissive, differential, respectful (etc)
and yet for all that it is something that relies even more deeply on a strict regime of taboo
and prohibition. It relies, in other words, on a submerged world of codes and rules of political
and  socio-cultural  encounter  and  if  we  do  not  implicitly  accept  the  latter  then  we  risk
expulsion. In a way, the contemporary paradigm is one that obliges ‘us’ to be fetishists. On
the one hand we are all au fait with contextuality and de-centredness and so on, but on the
other we are compelled to take seriously the idea of socio-cultural authenticity in order to be
able to participate fully in the symbolic order. This goes some way towards explaining a
certain American paradox. While American society is highly diverse and secularized it  is
nonetheless supplemented by the more or less official taboo as regards atheism. America
is, in this sense, Jehovah’s Witness. It is charged with the task of bringing, in Bush’s words,
God’s gift of democracy to the world. Thus it is not so much ‘In God We Trust’ (as the dollar
motto has it), but rather that God trusts America as His/Her authentic agent on earth.
What I find so compelling in Žižek’s work is his consistent demonstration of the ways
in which the symbolic order tends to rely upon a set of implicit and guarded obscenities. In
particular  it  is  the  way in  which  political  practice is  sustained by a libidinal  economy of
enjoyment, prohibition, tacit codes and so on. The same can also be said of the converse:
that in the libidinal economy we can find an essential political functioning. And this is true in
a quite literal sense of sexual drive and the pornographic. Here I differ somewhat with Kay
(2003) and her interpretation of Žižek’s discussion of a well known pornographic image: a
‘spit roast’ where a woman is on her back anonymously reduced to vagina, mouth and throat
while two men, anonymously reduced to penises, are working on the aforementioned in a
thoroughly  impersonal  way.  Inverting  Deleuze,  Žižek  uses  this  as  an  example  of  a
representation  of  organs  without  bodies.  While  Kay  finds  this  reference  shocking  she
nonetheless sees it as acceptable insofar as it is ‘performing theoretical work’ (2003: 101).
However I would argue that this needs to be looked at in more direct and literal terms as
demonstrating  the  way in  which  the  inhuman  flows  in  and  through  us  as  a  thoroughly
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inherent and untameable dimension. In this context, what the pornographic bears witness to
is the traumatic fact that all bodies comprise (relatively) independent ‘alien’ organs – the
minimal pulsations of life – that embody drive in excess of any symbolic unity or human
holism. The very ‘unnaturalness’ of the image underscores the Lacanian insight that there is
no sexual relationship (which is precisely why sex as sex occurs – otherwise it would simply
be an empty biological process). 
Yet  if  the  sexual  relationship  is  impossible  it  is  precisely  on  this  basis  that  we
experience a certain relationship with impossibility as such. We touch and are touched by
the  inhuman  in  the  act(s)  of  sex.  In  this  direct  and  immediate  sense  we  experience
ourselves as creatures rooted in the impossible-Real. On this basis, improvising on the well-
known D. H. Lawrence aphorism, it is an experience of the impossible stepping through our
loins. Through sexual encounter we simultaneously engage with the symbolic unity of the
body (we ‘make love’) and with the organs that reflect an elementary existential autonomy
beyond any such unity.
The human condition is one that reflects a traumatic irreconcilability between the body
and its organs.  At  the  same time this  irreconcilability  is  also the very source of  human
freedom.  It  is  this  primordial  alienation  that  allows  for  the  radical  transformation  and
recomposition of  the body as a symbolic order (in different contexts/relationships we are
different types of body). The pornographic speaks to a basic autonomy that is shattering of
symbolic integrity and closure. In this precise sense we might say that the pornographic is
the political. The intimate and the cosmic are interwoven in such a way that the alien excess
functions as an inherent background (like dark matter) to what is in the symbolic order more
than that order. 
Here we see an inversion of the Durkheimian problematic. Whereas Durkheim saw the
breakdown of organic solidarity as anomic – something to be avoided at all costs – this
approach affirms the opposite:  a fundamental  solidarity with the anomic and indeed the
inhuman. It is an approach based on the realization that the body politic is itself an artificial
composite  of  capricious  organs  that  can  always  re-form  onto  new  possibilities  and
configurations. In today’s attempts to construct a global body-politic the alien is feared and
marginalized as so much pathological distortion, criminality, archaic residue (the ‘clash of
civilizations’ etc.).  In this context the cinematic representation of  the visionary is rarely a
hero/heroine  and  all  too  often  a  psychopath/terrorist.  The  alien  aspect  is  further  stifled
through a constant bombardment of choices (press this number, click here etc) precisely as
a way of closing down the possibilities of more radical forms of choosing and/or refusal. This
is  perfectly  encapsulated  in  the  famous  monologue  from  Trainspotting  delivered  by the
Ewan McGregor character Renton:
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Choose life…Choose  a career.  Choose a family.  Choose a fucking  big  television,
choose  washing  machines,  cars,  compact  disc  players  and  electrical  tin  openers.
Choose good health, low cholesterol and dental insurance…I chose not to choose life.
I chose something else.
Contemporary culture is one that tries to elevate the ‘choose life’ over the ‘I chose not
to  choose  life’.  In  other  words  what  it  continuously  tries  to  prevent  is  choices  about
modalities of choosing. There is no choice in this matter. It brooks no refusal. The culture of
choice is one of disabling radical choosing.
Žižek’s psychopolitical perspective is one that accords the inhuman its full dignity and,
in a sense, argues for a new type of sovereignty for the latter. The truly human social order
is one that paradoxically must come to terms with the inherent dimension of alien excess. It
should not seek to repress or contain it (or re-channel it in obscene ways), but should be
affirmed as the basis of a new type of political sensibility: one that utilizes excess in order to
reach for, and indeed grasp, the impossible.
Yet  the  very  ambitiousness  of  such  a  project  is  one  that  inevitably  gives  rise  to
numerous theoretical and political questions. The importance of this journal lays not only
with advancing and refining these questions but also with taking up the latter as a basis for
new types of research in unforeseen directions. In this way we might say that the journal
represents a collective of organs without a pre-given, or idealized, Žižekian body. So far
from  being  murdered  or  prematurely  interred  the  response  of  this  journal  must  be  far
crueler. For his abominable intrusions Žižek must be relentlessly prosecuted as one of the
eternally unforgiven.
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